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Pharmaceutical Patents, Paragraph IV, and Pay-for-Delay: The Landscape
of Drug Patent Litigation and the Lessons Provided for the Recently Passed
Biosimilar Approval Pathway
By Brett Havranek1
The1Hatch-Waxman Amendments created
a three-way intersection between pharmaceutical,
intellectual property, and antitrust law, but there is
no stop sign, and collisions are common. The laws
governing generic drug approval incentivize the
filing of patent infringement
suits, which often lead to
reverse settlements where the
manufacturers of patented drugs
pay their generic competitors
to remain off the market. In
1984, Congress passed the
Hatch-Waxman Amendments,
a major revision to the Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act, which
hoped to strike the difficult
balance between encouraging research and development
of new drugs and the desire for a robust generic drug
industry that could supply the public with inexpensive
medication.2 To bolster the generic industry, Congress
created a unique exception to patent exclusivity, allowing
generic drug manufacturers to research, develop, and
test their products to prepare them for submission to
the FDA, all without infringing the innovator’s patents.3
The generic’s new privileges are counterbalanced in
part by allowing the patent holder to immediately
and unilaterally halt the FDA’s approval of the generic

1. Brett Havranek, 2011 J.D. Candidate at the Washington College of Law at American University. A.B. in Biology and Economics
in 2006 at Washington University in St. Louis. Prior to writing
this article, the author was employed in the pharmaceutical research
industry monitoring clinical trials, but the author was not affiliated
with any of the litigants in the cases discussed.
2. See Andrx Pharm., Inc. v. Biovail Corp., 276 F.3d 1368, 137071 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“Under the Drug Price Competition and
Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (the ‘Hatch Waxman Amendments’ to the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (‘FFDCA’)),
Congress struck a balance between two competing policy interests:
(1) inducing pioneering research and development of new drugs and
(2) enabling competitors to bring low-cost, generic copies of those
drugs to market.”).
3. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2009) (excluding the use of a patented invention for purposes related to an FDA submission from
the definition of infringement).
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for up to thirty months.4 This gives the patentee5 an
advantageous legal position to exploit, where, by filing
for patent infringement, a competitor is automatically
prevented from entering the market. The unique
economics of the pharmaceutical industry provide a
wide set of legal options for the patentee,
from simply buying monopoly time by
pursuing the infringement action, to
actually paying the defendant to settle
the case and refrain from competing in
the drug market. These so-called “reverse
settlement” or “pay-for-delay” cases
have drawn the attention of government
antitrust regulators6 and Congress,7 while
causing some inconsistencies between the
circuits and some ambiguity as to where
each circuit stands on the legality of reverse payments.8
Part I of this Article briefly discusses
pharmacoeconomics and the drug development process
to elucidate why infringement actions are so common
and why reverse settlements are relatively unique to
the pharmaceutical industry. Part II details the generic
drug approval process originally set up by the HatchWaxman Act and explains how the law bypasses the
usual judicial balancing of equities in the preliminary
injunction process, which ultimately incentivizes filing
infringement suits. Part III explores the eventual results
of drug patent infringement suits and the legal issues
they create: Once filed, these suits are difficult for
the generic to challenge and may last for a long time,
4. 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(C) (2009).
5. This Article uses the terms “patentee,” “innovator,” and “brand”
interchangeably, as is common in the drug industry. In some
circumstances, a generic can actually be its own brand, and these
are called “branded generics,” but here, “brand” refers only to the
innovator.
6. See, e.g., Health Care Div., Fed. Trade Comm’n, Overview of
FTC Antitrust Actions in Pharmaceutical Services and Products
(2009).
7. See, e.g., Tracy Staton, Congress Grills Generics Firms on Payfor-Delay, FiercePharma, June 4, 2009, available at http://www.
fiercepharma.com/story/congress-grills-generics-firms-pay-delay/2009-06-04 for excerpts of recent Congressional hearings on
pay-for-delay.
8. See infra Part III.
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thereby creating favorable conditions for the generic
to enter into a mutually beneficial reverse settlement
agreement with the brand. In these agreements, the
brand pays the generic not to market its product, and
in doing so, the brand guarantees its profitable market
exclusivity. These agreements can straddle the line
between an exercise of the innovator’s lawful patent
monopoly rights and an antitrust injury to other generic
competitors and consumers. Part IV applies the lessons
learned from twenty-five years under the Hatch-Waxman
approval regime to Congress’s latest legislation: the new
approval process for generic biologic medicines. The
current biosimilar pathway contains a set of provisions
that can be used together in conjunction with a reverse
settlement to prolong an innovator’s exclusivity period
while providing a defense to antitrust challenges.
Part I — Drug Development and Pharmacoeconomics
Unlike virtually all other patented products, new
drugs have an especially long development10 process
and require FDA approval before they can be lawfully
marketed.11 Three to six years before involving the
FDA, the research process typically begins by screening
between 5000 and 10,000 potential drug molecules,
followed by further laboratory and animal studies on
approximately 250 of the most promising candidates.12
Of these 250 candidates, only about five are suitable
for human trials, for which the sponsor must file an
Investigational New Drug Application (IND) to notify
the FDA of its intent to initiate clinical trials.13 Filing an
IND triggers a significant set of regulatory requirements
that apply throughout the remainder of the drug’s
testing,14 burdening the innovator without providing
any guarantee of success. Once the IND is in effect,
the five potential drugs are subjected to three successive
9

9. The terms “drug” and “pharmaceutical” are sometimes used
nonspecifically in the literature and may encompass both biologics/
biopharmaceuticals and traditional small-molecule drugs/pharmaceuticals. A significant part of this Article deals with the legal
interactions between generic manufacturers and patentees, but as
of this writing, there are no approved generic biologics. Therefore,
when possible, the statistics presented here disaggregate the two
markets. In this Article, “drug” and “pharmaceutical” are used to
refer to traditional small-molecule drugs.
10. When discussing the development of a new drug in this Article, the author assumes the new drug to be a new chemical entity,
not just a reformulation of an existing product.
11. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2009).
12. Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, Pharmaceutical Industry Profile 2009 36 (2009) [hereinafter PhRMA
Profile].
13. See id.; see also 21 C.F.R. § 312.20 (2009) (explaining when an
IND is required to be submitted to the FDA).
14. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. pt. 312 (2009).

phases of clinical trials15 over the next six to seven
years. Statistically, only one and a half of the candidates
progress to the final stage (phase III) of the trial process16
where they are able to accumulate data demonstrating
safety and substantial evidence of effectiveness17 that
supports the filing of a New Drug Application (NDA)
with the FDA.18 Another six months19 to two years pass
during the FDA’s typical review of the NDAs, and on
average, only one drug ultimately receives approval for
sale and marketing.20 Even when the NDA is approved,
the FDA requires additional post-approval (phase IV)
research21 in 72% of new drugs.22
The entire process, resulting in one FDAapproved drug, typically takes ten to fifteen years to
complete.23 There is some disagreement about the
average cost to develop one approved new drug, but
the most recent estimates include $802 million in a
2002 study24 (excluding an additional $95 million for
post-approval research costs, adjusted down to approvalyear dollars),25 $1.3 billion in a 2005 study,26 and $1.7
billion in a 2002 study (including the costs of preparing
15. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.21 (2009) (listing the phases of clinical
trials).
16. See Joseph A. DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New
Estimates of Drug Development Costs, 22 J. Health Econ. 151, 162
(2003) (estimating that the probability of phase III entry is 31.4%).
17. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2009) (requiring that proof of safety
and substantial evidence of effectiveness).
18. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.50 (2009) (listing all the requirements for
an NDA).
19. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(1) (2009) (requiring a decision by the
FDA on drug applications within 180 days, but allowing a longer
period if the applicant agrees).
20. PhRMA Profile, supra note 12, at 36.
21. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.85 (2009) (allowing the FDA to tie marketing approval with the applicant’s agreement to conduct phase IV
research).
22. See Accenture, The Pursuit of High Performance Through Research and Development – Understanding Pharmaceutical Research
and Development Cost Drivers 17 (Pharmaceutical Research Manufacturers of America 2007) available at http://www.phrma.org/files/
Accenture%20R&D%20Report-2007.pdf (“The FDA is increasingly requiring companies to commit to post-approval activities. In
2005, 13 (72 percent) of the 18 new molecular entities approved
required post-marketing activities, ranging from a single human in
vivo drug interaction study to a large randomized safety study to
assess major clinical outcomes.”).
23. See PhRMA Profile, supra note 12, at 36.
24. See DiMasi, supra note 16, at 166 (“Our base case out-of-pocket cost per approved new drug is US$ 403 million, while our fully
capitalized total cost estimate is US$ 802 million.”).
25. See id. at 173. The total out-of-pocket capitalized cost in
approval-year dollars is broken down so that the pre-approval cost is
$802 million and the post approval cost is $95 million. The money
spent on post-approval research does include an average of 15% on
improvements to already-approved drugs. Id.
26. PhRMA Profile, supra note 12, at 39.
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to market the drug).27 These extremely high research
and development costs are reflected in the industry’s
overall research spending of approximately $52 billion in
2005.28
The high cost of initial development stands in
stark contrast to the relatively simple and inexpensive
process of gaining approval for a generic drug. The most
important element of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments
to the pharmaceutical industry was its creation of
an expedited method for generic manufacturers to
gain FDA approval for their products.29 Generic
manufacturers are allowed to file an Abbreviated New
Drug Application (ANDA) in which they need only to
demonstrate that their generic is the same as a branded
drug (bioequivalence) and do not have to re-prove
that the drug is safe and effective.30 Under the more
lenient ANDA requirements, the cost of obtaining FDA
approval for a generic drug is only a few million dollars,
which creates a major dichotomy in development costs
between innovators and generics.31
As an incentive for generic manufacturers to
challenge innovator patents, the law gives the first
generic applicant to submit a substantially complete
ANDA 180 days of marketing exclusivity before other
ANDAs can be approved by the FDA.32 Originally,
the first Paragraph IV ANDA filer was required to
successfully defend against a patentee’s infringement
suit to qualify for the 180 days of exclusivity,33 but this
27. See Accenture, supra note 22, at 4 (“Though estimates differ,
one source suggests that the cost of an approved pharmaceutical
drug, including average launch costs, has gone up from 1.1 billion
in 1995-2000 to 1.7 billion in 2000-2002.”).
28. See Accenture, supra note 22, at 4 (“Approximately $51.8 billion was spent by US biopharmaceutical companies alone in 2005.
R&D spending by Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers
of America (PhRMA) member companies, representing the top
pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies in the United States,
went up 53.5 percent, from $26 billion in 2000 to $39.9 billion
in 2005.”) (citation omitted). This aggregate statistic may include
spending on the development of biologics as well as traditional
drugs but is nevertheless illustrative of the massive costs of researching new medicines.
29. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2009).
30. See id. § 355(j)(2)(A).
31. See Henry G. Grabowski, Patents and New Product Development in the Pharmaceutical and Biotechnology Industries, in Science
and Cents: Exploring the Economics of Biotechnology 87, 90 (John
V. Duca & Mine K. Yucel eds., Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas)
(2003) (“Generic firms can file an abbreviated new drug application
(ANDA). The ANDA process only takes a few years and typically
costs a few million dollars.”).
32. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2009).
33. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.107(c)(1) (1998); see also In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (“FDA regulation in effect conditioned the first Paragraph IV
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requirement was officially eliminated in 1998.34 Now,
successful judgment on the patent for a subsequent
ANDA filer can force the first filer to either begin or
forfeit its exclusivity period.35
The extremely high costs associated with
developing a single marketable pharmaceutical product
only begin to set the stage for reverse settlements and
other arguably anticompetitive behavior. The market
for pharmaceuticals is extremely lopsided, where the
“blockbuster” drugs comprising the top decile of the
market generate eighty percent of all drug sales.36 In fact,
the drug market is so lopsided that eighty percent of all
pharmaceuticals will never recoup their own research
and development costs.37 The extreme profitability of a
small proportion of drugs creates a powerful incentive
for brand name manufacturers to preserve their
marketing exclusivity, resulting in unique legal strategies
such as pay-for-delay.
While innovators have a strong financial reason
to preserve their monopolies, generic manufacturers have
comparatively much less to gain by entering the market.
Although a generic is supposed to be equivalent in
efficacy to its brand-name competitor, the prices charged
by generics and brands are very different. The decrease
in the innovator’s profits due to the generic’s arrival
is normally much higher than the generic’s potential
profit were it to enter the market. Thus, if the innovator
were to pay its potential generic competitor the entire
amount of the generic’s expected profit in exchange for
an agreement to stay off the market or to delay entry,
the innovator would still see higher profits than if it
were competing with the generic.38 An examination of
the national drug market is illustrative: while branded
ANDA filer’s right to the 180-day exclusivity period on a ‘successful
defense’ of its Paragraph IV ANDA against the patent holder.”).
34. See 63 Fed. Reg. 59710 (Nov. 5, 1998).
35. See 21 U.S.C. §355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I)(bb)(AA); See also Caraco
Pharm. Lab. v. Forest Lab., 527 F.3d 1278, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(“Only the first Paragraph IV ANDA filer can trigger its 180-day
exclusivity period via the commercial-marketing trigger. However,
subsequent Paragraph IV ANDA filers can trigger the first Paragraph
IV ANDA filer’s 180-day exclusivity period via the court-judgment
trigger.”) (citation omitted).
36. See Congressional Research Service, Patent Law and Its Application to the Pharmaceutical Industry: An Examination of the
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984
(“The Hatch-Waxman Act”), Congressional Research Service 38-39
(2005).
37. See PhRMA Profile, supra note 12, at 39.
38. See FTC, Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration, Federal Trade Commission viii (2002) (“a generic applicant’s potential
liability for lost profits on the brand-name drug usually will vastly
exceed its own potential profits after market entry.”).
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drugs make up only 28.5% of prescriptions dispensed,
they still account for 78.4% of the money spent on
prescriptions.39 On an individual drug level, brand name
prescriptions sold for an average of 3.5 times more than
their generic counterparts in 2007.40 In only one-year’s
time, the 2008 innovator-to-generic price ratio has risen
to 3.941 despite the preexisting disparity.
The substantial price differences between
innovators and generics, the high research and
development costs associated with new pharmaceuticals,
and the uncertainty that any drug candidate in the
innovator’s development pipeline will attain blockbuster
profitability give patentees a strong incentive to preserve
and prolong market exclusivity. These factors allow
for reverse settlements in which the brand and the
generic both make more money if the generic stays
off the market. The increasing prices of branded
drugs compared to their generic counterparts should
make these settlements even more profitable in the
future. From an economic perspective, as long as the
innovator’s potential loss vastly exceeds the generic
manufacturer’s potential gain, reverse settlements
will offer a Pareto improvement42 for pharmaceutical
suppliers when the number of potential generic
entrants is small. Accordingly, the industry association
representing generic manufacturers supports reverse
patent settlements43 as does the industry association for

innovators.44
Part II — The Unique Legal Status of
Pharmaceutical Patents

Patents typically afford the holder twenty years
of exclusivity to market a product.45 However, when
the patented article is a drug, the patent holder must
also wait for the FDA’s approval before selling it.46 For
the pharmaceutical patent holder, this means the actual
amount of sales exclusivity before a generic becomes
available is typically between ten and fifteen years.47
Not surprisingly, the increased incentive to challenge
the patents on blockbuster drugs results in these drugs
having average exclusivity periods toward the bottom of
this range.48
As part of the tradeoff for allowing generics
to rely on the original safety and efficacy data in the
innovator’s NDA, the generic is required to submit:
(A) a certification . . . with respect to each patent
which claims the drug for which such investigations were
conducted or which claims a use for such drug for which
the applicant is seeking approval under this subsection
and for which information is required to be filed . . .
(i) that such patent information has not been
filed,
(ii) that such patent has expired,
(iii) of the date on which such patent will expire,
or
(iv) that such patent is invalid or will not be
39. See Generic Pharmaceutical Association, Celebrating the Past
Defining the Future 28 (2009).
infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale of the new drug
40. See Facts at a Glance | Generic Pharmaceutical Association,
for which the application is submitted . . . .49
available at http://www.gphaonline.org/about-gpha/about-generics/
To generic manufacturers, the most
facts (last visited Nov. 5, 2009) (“In 2007, the average retail price of
a generic prescription drug was $34.34. The average retail price of a
important of these certifications is the Paragraph IV
brand name prescription drug was $119.51. (source: The National
certification because it potentially leads to a challenge
Association of Chain Drug Stores, 2007)”).
41. See Industry Facts-at-a-Glance, National Association of Chain
Drug Stores, http://www.nacds.org/wmspage.cfm?parm1=6536 (last
visited Nov. 5, 2009) (stating that the average brand name prescription price in 2008 was $137.90, and the average generic price in
2008 was $35.22).
42. A Pareto improvement is a situation where resources are allocated to make one entity better off without hurting anyone else.
Here, the brand can afford to pay its generic competitors all of the
money they would have made by selling their products, or could
even agree to pay more money than the generics could have possibly
made in the market, all while still remaining better off than if it
were competing with the generics. Because no one is worse off and
some (or all) are better off, these reverse settlement agreements that
create a Pareto improvement are a natural occurrence. The allocations analyzed here which result in a Pareto improvement are only
the potential supply allocations and resulting profits among drug
manufacturers, not the allocations among suppliers and consumers.
43. Patent Settlements | Generic Pharmaceutical Association,
http://www.gphaonline.org/issues/patent-settlements (last visited
Oct. 18, 2009) (“GPhA opposes an outright ban on settlements as a
means of resolving patent litigation.”).

44. See PHRMA – PhRMA Statement on Authorized Generics,
http://www.phrma.org/news_room/press_releases/phrma_statement_on_authorized_generics (last visited Nov. 5, 2009) (“[I]t is
unfortunate that the FTC used this potentially valuable report . .
. to further its attack on patent settlements. Neither authorized
generics nor patent settlements have discouraged the availability of
generics to patients.”).
45. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2009).
46. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2009).
47. See Henry G. Grabowskia & Margaret Kyleb, Generic Competition and Market Exclusivity Periods in Pharmaceuticals, 28 Managerial & Decision Econ. 491, 493 (2007) (“The NMEs [(New
Molecular Entities)] in the two smallest [market] size categories
have the longest MEPs [(Market Exclusivity Periods)] with averages of approximately 15 years. By contrast, the average MEPs for
market size categories above $100 million are in the 10.5–12.5 year
range.”).
48. See id.
49. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2)(A) (2009) (emphasis added).
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of the innovator’s patent.50 When generics make this
certification, they must agree to notify the patent holder
of their intention to seek approval of the drug.51 This
notice must include a statement of the legal and factual
basis for the generic’s belief that it will not infringe
the innovator’s patent.52 When the generic makes a
Paragraph IV certification, the FDA cannot make any
approval effective for forty-five days, giving the patentee
an opportunity to file an infringement suit.53 If the
patentee files an infringement suit against the generic,
the FDA cannot approve the generic’s ANDA for thirty
months,54 unless the generic wins the infringement
case.55
The key effect of Paragraph IV is to dramatically
increase the innovator’s incentive to file suit because
the existence of an infringement suit alone has the
same ultimate effect as a judicially-granted injunction:
the generic manufacturer is prevented from selling its
product because it cannot gain the necessary approval.56
The law does not provide any way for a generic with a
strong case for non-infringement to continue with the
approval process, except to get a ruling that the patent
is invalid or has not been infringed.57 Still, a ruling
may take considerable time, usually not less than thirty
months.58 By contrast, in a normal patent infringement
proceeding, the patentee would have to petition the
court for a preliminary injunction, and the court would
weigh the following four factors, the first two of which
are required: “(1) a reasonable likelihood of success on
the merits; (2) irreparable harm if an injunction is not
granted; (3) a balance of hardships tipping in its favor;
and (4) the injunction’s favorable impact on the public
interest.”59 A recent case illustrated the inconsistency of
the two approaches when an innovator pharmaceutical
company’s thirty-month Hatch-Waxman “injunction”
expired, and the innovator had to request a judicially50. See id. § 355(b)(2)(A)(iv).
51. See id. § 355(b)(3)(A); id. § 355(b)(3)(C).
52. See id. § 355(b)(3)(D)(ii).
53. See id. § 355(c)(3)(C).
54. Id.
55. See id. § 355(c)(3)(C)(i).
56. See id. § 355(c)(3)(C); id. § 355(a).
57. See id. § 355(c)(3)(C)(i).
58. See FTC, supra note 38, at iv (“The data also do not indicate
that court decisions in ANDA-related patent litigation typically are
reached much earlier than 30 months from notice of the generic’s
ANDA.”). See also, for example, Altana Pharma AG v. Teva Pharm.
USA, Inc., 566 F.3d 999 (Fed. Cir. 2009), where the infringement
proceedings were still in progress after the expiration of the HatchWaxman stay.
59. See Altana, 566 F.3d at 1005.
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imposed preliminary injunction.60 The district court
found that the patentee failed to establish a likelihood
of success on the merits and irreparable harm,61 and on
appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s
denial of injunctive relief.62 In this case, the automatic
thirty-month stay gave the patentee a significant amount
of market exclusivity that would have never been
available to a non-pharmaceutical patentee.
Part III — Pay-for-Delay and Antitrust
The economics of the pharmaceutical market
combine with the Hatch-Waxman generic approval
scheme to incentivize and facilitate reverse settlement
payments from patentees to generics. In any case,
innovators can decide to file an infringement suit
irrespective of any intent to settle, opting simply to
prolong the litigation and enjoy thirty months of
exclusivity before the FDA can approve the generic. In
either of these situations, little recourse is available to
competing generics and the public.
Challenges to the legality of reverse payments
have been made on antitrust grounds, and challenges to
the patentee’s filing of an infringement suit have been
made on both antitrust and Rule 11 grounds. Except in
cases where fraud is alleged, neither approach has been
particularly successful. If the innovator’s initial filing of
an infringement suit is fought under an antitrust theory
of delaying generic competitors from coming to market,
the innovator is often immunized from antitrust liability
because it is only trying to enforce its constitutional
patent exclusivity rights.63 If the filing of suit is contested
under Rule 11, two legal facts, that patents are presumed
valid and that filing an ANDA is a technical act of
60. See id. at 1004 (“On or about April 6, 2004, Teva filed an Abbreviated New Drug Application (‘ANDA’) pursuant to the HatchWaxman Act . . . . Sun filed similarly directed ANDA applications
on or about March 1, 2005, and June 25, 2005. Both Teva and Sun
filed paragraph IV certifications in conjunction with their respective ANDA applications. . . . Altana filed a motion for preliminary
injunction on June 22, 2007.”).
61. See id. at 1005 (“Based on Altana’s failure to establish either a
likelihood of success on the merits or irreparable harm, the district
court denied the motion for preliminary injunction.”).
62. See id. at 1011.
63. See Andrx Pharm., Inc. v. Elan Corp., 421 F.3d 1227, 1234
(11th Cir. 2005) (“Based on this precedent, we agree with the
district court that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine shields Elan from
antitrust liability for filing two patent infringement suits against
Andrx in relation to the manufacture and sale of controlled release
naproxen. The United States Constitution expressly permits the
government to grant exclusive monopolies in the form of patents,
and therefore the Sherman Act cannot be read to impede a litigant
from seeking to defend constitutionally-permitted patent rights.”)
(citation omitted).
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infringement, combine such that there is usually a
non-frivolous basis for filing suit.64 Therefore, in many
cases, the act of filing an infringement suit cannot be
challenged with any reasonable expectation of success,
leaving only the settlement agreements themselves
potentially vulnerable to attack.
By the very nature of a lawsuit, a claimant
files suit alleging some harm in the hopes of getting
a favorable legal determination, money, or both.
Therefore, when a claimant alleging patent infringement
in a Paragraph IV suit offers money to the alleged
wrongdoer, the settlement seems puzzling. When the
patentee actually pays the infringing generic more
money to settle the case than the generic could possibly
have made selling its product, the result becomes
downright “suspicious”65 in light of the Sherman Act,
which bars contracts and combinations that restrain
trade66 and prohibits any attempt to monopolize
commerce.67 Nevertheless, the courts of appeals, except
possibly the Sixth Circuit whose position is particularly
ambiguous,68 have upheld the legality of some of these
agreements, as long as their terms stay “within the
exclusionary zone of the patent.”69
The confusion over pay-for-delay began when
the Sixth Circuit first declared a reverse settlement
agreement illegal. The Sixth Circuit decided the first
Paragraph IV settlement antitrust case, In re Cardizem
64. See, e.g., Celgene Corp. v. KV Pharm. Co., No. 07-4819, 2008
WL 2856469 at *3 (D.N.J. July 22, 2008) (“[T]he act of infringement alleged in the complaint is the filing of an ANDA—not the
manufacture or sale of the product. Because the Act has made
the act of submitting an ANDA itself an act of infringement, in a
Hatch-Waxman ANDA case, the attorney can conduct a reasonable
and competent inquiry into the act of infringement by investigating
whether a relevant ANDA has been filed.”).
65. In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 208
(Fed. Cir. 2006) (“There is something on the face of it that does
seem ‘suspicious’ about a patent holder settling patent litigation
against a potential generic manufacturer by paying that manufacturer more than either party anticipates the manufacturer would earn
by winning the lawsuit and entering the newly competitive market
in competition with the patent holder. Why, after all—viewing the
settlement through an antitrust lens—should the potential competitor be permitted to receive such a windfall at the ultimate expense of
drug purchasers?”).
66. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2009).
67. See id. § 2.
68. See In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544
F.3d 1323, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“To the extent that the Sixth
Circuit may have found a per se antitrust violation based solely on
the reverse payments, we respectfully disagree.”).
69. See id. at 1336 (“The essence of the inquiry is whether the
agreements restrict competition beyond the exclusionary zone of
the patent. This analysis has been adopted by the Second and the
Eleventh Circuits . . . and we find it to be completely consistent
with Supreme Court precedent.”).

CD Antitrust Litigation, where an innovator agreed to
pay the first-filing generic manufacturer $40 million per
year not to sell any generic equivalent of the patented
drug and to not relinquish its right to the 180-day
exclusivity period.70 The court classified the agreement
as a per se antitrust violation, noting that the 180-day
exclusivity provision acted to delay other potential
entrants and that the agreement inhibited competition
by paying the innovator’s only potential competitor to
stay out of the market.71 The court said that “HMR’s
agreement to pay Andrx $40 million per year not to
bring its generic product to market . . . is a naked,
horizontal restraint of trade that is per se illegal.”72 The
Sixth Circuit’s reasoning looks more to the character
of the settlement agreement and its actual effects on
competition, rather than focusing as intently on the
scope of the agreement with respect to the patent.
Unlike the Sixth Circuit, the Eleventh
Circuit took a more lenient stance on reverse
settlements. Shortly after the Sixth Circuit’s decision,
the Eleventh Circuit weighed in on reverse settlements
in Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals Inc., when
an innovator entered into reverse payment settlements
with two of its generic competitors.73 Though the terms
of these settlements were similar to those in Cardizem,74
the Eleventh Circuit decided that settlements were not
per se antitrust violations.75 When determining if there
was antitrust liability, the court examined whether the
settlement agreements extended beyond the exclusionary
power granted by the patent.76 Although at least one
agreement contained a provision protecting the generic’s
180-day exclusivity77 and the agreements might have
gone beyond prohibiting only infringing generics, the
court felt the per se label was still not appropriate.78
On its face, the Eleventh Circuit’s precedent appears
to conflict with the Sixth Circuit’s holding. The
Eleventh Circuit noted that “[t]he failure to produce the
70. 332 F.3d 896, 902 (6th Cir. 2003).
71. Id. at 907-08.
72. Id. at 911.
73. 344 F.3d 1294, 1300 (11th Cir. 2003).
74. Id. at 1311 n.25.
75. Id. at 1309.
76. See id. at 1305-06.
77. See id. at 1300 (“Geneva agreed not to transfer or sell its rights
under its ANDAs, including its right to the 180-day exclusivity
period. Geneva also agreed to oppose any subsequent ANDA applicant’s attempt to seek approval of its application based on Geneva’s
failure to satisfy the then-existing successful defense requirement
and to join and support any attempt by Abbott to seek an extension
of the 30-month stay of FDA approval on Geneva’s tablet ANDA.”).
78. Id. at 1306 n.18.
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competing . . . drug, rather than the payment of money,
is the exclusionary effect,”79 highlighting the Eleventh
Circuit’s interest in the scope of the agreements rather
than the size of the payments or their practical effect.
The Second Circuit was the next court to decide
a pay-for-delay case, and it followed the Eleventh
Circuit’s approach. The Second Circuit made its
ruling on reverse settlements in In re Tamoxifen Citrate
Antitrust Litigation, when an innovator agreed to pay a
generic manufacturer $9.5 million dollars immediately
and $35.9 million over ten years for the generic to
change its Paragraph IV certification to a Paragraph III
certification, thereby allowing the generic to market the
infringing drug only after the innovator’s patent had
officially expired.80 The settlement occurred while an
appeal was pending after a district court had declared
that the patent was invalid,81 the agreement did not
cover non-infringing products,82 and the agreement was
made while the 180-day exclusivity period’s successful
defense requirement was in effect.83
The Second Circuit followed the Eleventh
Circuit and decided that reverse payments by a patentee
designed to protect its patent monopoly were not per se
antitrust violations,84 even though the settlement took
place after the patent was declared invalid but was on
appeal.85 The court noted that the successful defense
requirement meant the generic would not block other
competitors,86 but even if the agreement was “designed
to manipulate the 180-day exclusivity period,” any
injury was caused by the “valid patent and the inability
of other generic manufacturers to establish that the
patent was either invalid or not infringed.”87 As long as
the original infringement suit is not objectively baseless,
the settlement does not expand the patentee’s monopoly
beyond the patent’s scope, and there is no fraud, then
“[p]ayments, even ‘excessive’ payments, . . . [are] not
necessarily unlawful.”88 Like the Eleventh Circuit, the
Second Circuit’s analysis focused primarily on the scope
of the agreement, not the size of the payments or the
effect on competition.
In the most recent precedential case decided by
79. Id. at 1309.
80. 466 F.3d 187, 193-94 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
81. Id. at 193.
82. Id. at 213-14.
83. Id. at 219.
84. Id. at 205.
85. Id. at 206.
86. Id. at 214.
87. Id. at 219.
88. Id. at 213.
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an appeals court, the Federal Circuit also upheld a payfor-delay agreement. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride
Antitrust Litigation was the Federal Circuit’s chance
to speak on reverse payments, when it took an appeal
involving a settlement agreement worth $398.1
million.89 The generic agreed to change its Paragraph
IV certification to a Paragraph III certification,90
reserved the right to revert to Paragraph IV if a court
ever declared the patent invalid or unenforceable,91 and
agreed “not to market a generic version of Cipro until
the” patent at issue expired.92 Although the generic
retained its right to change certifications, the Federal
Circuit ignored this factor in its antitrust analysis
because the settlement agreement predated the change in
the successful defense requirement, and a prior court had
already determined the generic had lost its exclusivity
right under the law at the time.93
With this “bottleneck” element out of the way,
the Federal Circuit decided the agreement was not a
violation of antitrust law and essentially adopted the
Second and Eleventh Circuits’ holdings that reverse
payments alone were not per se antitrust violations.94
Also, it explicitly held that:
[when] all anticompetitive effects of the
settlement agreement are within the exclusionary power
of the patent, the outcome is the same whether the court
begins its analysis under antitrust law by applying a
rule of reason approach to evaluate the anti-competitive
effects, or under patent law by analyzing the right to
exclude afforded by the patent.95
With this statement, the Federal Circuit
foreclosed the possibility of using its exclusive
jurisdiction over patent cases96 to funnel Paragraph IV
antitrust cases away from the other circuits.97
89. 544 F.3d 1323, 1329 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
90. Id. at 1328-29.
91. Id. at 1329 n.4.
92. Id. at 1333.
93. Id. at 1339.
94. See id. at 1335-36.
95. Id. at 1336.
96. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2009).
97. See Ciprofloxacin, 544 F.3d at 1336 (“[T]he court need not
consider the validity of the patent in the antitrust analysis of a settlement agreement involving a reverse payment.”). Because the basis
of a reverse settlement is a generic’s technical infringement of an
innovator’s patent by filing the ANDA and Paragraph IV certification, if the Federal Circuit had ruled that patent validity mattered
when analyzing a reverse settlement, the Federal Circuit’s exclusive
jurisdiction over patent cases would have brought all future pay-fordelay cases to it. The possible exception would be if a case somehow
did not raise substantial issues of patent law.
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There is confusion among the courts98 and even
strong disagreement among commentators99 concerning
the state of the law in each circuit on reverse payments.
Some commentators characterize the Sixth Circuit as
employing the per se approach against the practice of
the Second and Eleventh Circuits,100 others lump the
Sixth and Eleventh Circuits’ approaches together and
contrast them with the Second and Federal Circuits’
holdings,101 and still others argue that all the circuits’
holdings are consistent.102 One of the chief impediments
to comparing the different circuits’ approaches is that the
slightly different features of the settlement agreements
in each case may be significant to each court’s respective
holding, but the opinions do not disentangle and
separately analyze the elements of the agreements clearly
enough to allow for a convenient comparison. For
example, the Federal Circuit attempted to distinguish its
Cipro decision from the Sixth Circuit’s per se holding in
Cardizem by pointing out that in Cardizem the generic
had agreed not to market non-infringing versions of
98. See id. at 1335 (“To the extent that the Sixth Circuit may have
found a per se antitrust violation based solely on the reverse payments, we respectfully disagree.”).
99. Compare Wansheng Jerry Liu, Balancing Accessibility and
Sustainability: How to Achieve the Dual Objectives of the HatchWaxman Act While Resolving Antitrust Issues in Pharmaceutical Patent
Settlement Cases 18 Alb. L.J. Sci. & Tech. 441, 462-63 (2008) (“In
addressing the antitrust issues of the patent settlement agreements
between brand-name and generic pharmaceutical companies, the
federal courts have adopted two different approaches. The Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that a settlement agreement
between a brand-name drug company and a generic drug company
to delay marketing until resolution of the patent infringement case
in exchange for a ‘reverse payment’ is classical restraint of trade and
per se illegal. The Eleventh and Second Circuits rejected this ‘per
se rule’ but instead considered the exclusionary power of the patent
and addressed whether the settlement agreements exceeded the
exclusionary power awarded by the patent law.) (citations omitted),
with Brief Amici Curiae of 54 Intellectual Property Law, Antitrust
Law, Economics, and Business Professors, the American Antitrust
Institute, the Public Patent Foundation, and the AARP in Support of the Petitioner, Arkansas Carpenters Health and Welfare
Fund v. Bayer, 129 S. Ct. 2828, 2 (2009) (No. 08-1194), 2009
WL 1144190, cert. denied, [hereinafter Brief Amici Curiae] (“The
Second/Federal Circuit Rule Is Unprecedented and Conflicts With
the Approaches of the Sixth Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit, and the
Federal Trade Commission”). But see Christopher M. Holman,
Patently-O, Holman: A Contrarian Law Professor’s Two Cents on the
Arkansas Carpenter’s (Ciprofloxacin) Petition for Certiorari, http://
www.patentlyo.com/patent/2009/05/holman-a-contrarian-law-professors-two-cents-on-the-arkansas-carpenters-ciprofloxacin-petitionfor-certiorari.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2009) (“[T]he decisions
by the Second Circuit and the Federal Circuit in Tamoxifen and
Ciprofloxacin are both entirely consistent with earlier decisions by
the other circuits . . . .”).
100. Liu, supra note 99.
101. Brief Amici Curiae, supra note 99.
102. Holman, supra note 99.

the drug.103 The difficulty with this approach is that the
Federal Circuit characterizes the settlement agreement
in Cipro as preventing the generic from manufacturing
or marketing “a generic version” of the drug, language
that appears to prevent non-infringing versions as
well.104 One way to reconcile the Federal Circuit’s
characterization of the Cipro agreement with its holding
is to assume the court was relying on the fact that the
patent in Cipro was on the underlying drug molecule105
and not the pharmaceutical’s formulation. Therefore,
presumably, a non-infringing generic was not possible,106
and the settlement agreement could cover all possible
generics without exceeding the scope of the patent.
Nevertheless, the exact basis for the court’s holding is
ambiguous.
An analysis of each circuit’s antitrust approach
reveals that, despite the conflicting interpretations,
there appear to be a set of settlement terms that would
satisfy each court, including the Sixth Circuit, whose
per se holding was the strictest. The Sixth Circuit’s per
se holding rests on only two facts: the reverse payments
to keep the generic off the market and the use of the
180-day exclusivity period to prevent additional entrants
to the market.107 The Sixth Circuit does not necessarily
declare all patent settlements per se illegal; rather, it
appears that the per se label attaches once the agreement
goes beyond enforcing patent rights and “bolster[s]
the patent’s effectiveness,”108 because, in Cardizem, the
103. Ciprofloxacin, 544 F.3d at 1335.
104. See id. at 1329 (“In return, Barr agreed not to manufacture,
or have manufactured, a generic version of Cipro in the United
States.”). See also id. at 1333 (“[T]he generic defendants agreed not
to market a generic version of Cipro until the ’444 patent expired .
. . .”).
105. See id. at 1329.
106. See In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187,
214 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“Like the patent for the compound ciprofloxacin hydrochloride, which was the subject of dispute in the Cipro
cases, and unlike the patents at issue in Cardizem and Valley Drug,
Zeneca’s tamoxifen patent is not a formulation patent, which covers only specific formulations or delivery methods of compounds;
rather, it is a patent on a compound that, by its nature, excludes all
generic versions of the drug.”).
107. See In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 907
(6th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he following facts are undisputed and dispositive. The Agreement guaranteed to HMR that its only potential
competitor at that time, Andrx, would, for the price of $10 million
per quarter, refrain from marketing its generic . . . the Agreement
also delayed the entry of other generic competitors, who could not
enter until the expiration of Andrx’s 180-day period of marketing
exclusivity, which Andrx had agreed not to relinquish or transfer.”).
108. See id. at 908 (“[T]he Agreement cannot be fairly characterized as merely an attempt to enforce patent rights or an interim
settlement of the patent litigation. As the plaintiffs point out, it
is one thing to take advantage of a monopoly that naturally arises
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“agreement’s restrictions extended to non-infringing
and/or potentially non-infringing versions of generic
Cardizem.”109 A reverse settlement agreement would
probably withstand the tests set forth by any of the
circuits, including the Sixth, if it promised only that the
generic would not infringe the listed patents, did not
block non-infringing generics from being marketed,
and forced the generic to abandon its Paragraph IV
certification and 180-day exclusivity period. In cases
where the listed patents included one on the drug
molecule itself, this settlement effectively prevents
the generic’s entry into the market without incurring
antitrust liability under the Sixth Circuit’s logic. The
result is that competitors and other affected parties
have little ability to challenge properly designed reverse
payments under an antitrust theory.
Part IV — Lessons from Hatch-Waxman for the
New Biosimilar Pathway

period to the first biosimilar.113 When a generic biologic
submits an application to the FDA, it must send detailed
information about the biogeneric and its production,114
and the reference product sponsor (i.e., the innovator
biologic) responds with a list of its patents115 and reasons
why they have been infringed.116 In turn, the biosimilar
either decides not to go to market before the innovator’s
patent expires, or certifies that it believes that the
innovator’s patent will not be infringed, is invalid, or is
unenforceable.117 The House bill makes submitting the
certification an act of infringement.118 Importantly, the
House bill only empowers the FDA to delay approval
of the generic biologic after a court has ruled against the
biosimilar.119
The new biosimilar pathway passed by Congress
is similar to the House bill but with two important
additions. First, it requires participation in negotiations
over which patent claims should be litigated before
the alleged infringer can be subject to an infringement
action.120 Second, the current biosimilar pathway offers
variable amounts of exclusivity for the first biosimilar to
be approved: the first biosimilar never has more than
one year of actual marketing exclusivity, but biogenerics
seeking approval afterward can be delayed up to fortytwo months if the first is involved in infringement
litigation and decides not to risk marketing its
product.121
Both the failed House bill and the enacted
biosimilar legislation make several important
improvements over the generic drug approval scheme.
First, they eliminate the delays associated with Paragraph
IV certification by allowing biosimilars to be approved
without facing a statutorily-mandated halt in the FDA’s
issuance of an approval in response to an innovator’s
infringement suit. Once approved, biogenerics can
market their potentially infringing products at their own

For over twenty years, drug companies have
lived with the compromises built into the HatchWaxman Amendments, but the new healthcare reform
bill passed by Congress created an approval pathway
for biosimilars110 and is the future of generic medicines.
Spending on biologic products is growing by fifteen to
twenty percent annually and has already risen to about
$40 billion in 2006.111 Congress failed to learn from
the weaknesses of the Hatch-Waxman regime when
designing the new biosimilar approval process, but
Congress still has the opportunity to amend the pathway
before biosimilars begin to utilize the new system.
Presently, the biosimilar pathway contains a set of
provisions that can be used together to facilitate reverse
settlements and to help justify them to courts.
For perspective, it is helpful to compare the
current biosimilar pathway with an older proposal that
was not enacted. During the 111th Congress, the House
of Representatives’ approach to biosimilars in H.R.
113. See id. (adding § 351(k)(6) to the Public Health Service Act).
1548 grants twelve years of marketing exclusivity to new
114. See id. (adding § 351(l)(4)(A)(i) to the Public Health Service
biologics112 and gives a twenty-four-month exclusivity
Act).
from a patent, but another thing altogether to bolster the patent’s
effectiveness.”).
109. See id. at 909 n.13.
110. In this Article, the terms “biosimilar,” “biogeneric,” and “generic biologic” are used interchangeably.
111. Congressional Budget Office, Congressional Budget Office
Cost Estimate S. 1695 Biologics Price Competition and Innovation
Act of 2007 5 (2008).
112. Pathway for Biosimilars Act, H.R. 1548, 111th Cong. §
101(a)(2) (2009) (amending § 351(k)(7) of the Public Health Service Act) (as introduced in the House on Mar. 17, 2009).
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115. See id. (adding § 351(l)(4)(A)(ii) to the Public Health Service
Act).
116. See id. (adding § 351(l)(4)(C)(i) to the Public Health Service
Act).
117. See id. (adding § 351(l)(4)(D) to the Public Health Service
Act).
118. See id. § 201(3) (amending 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)).
119. See id. § 101(a)(2) (adding § 351(l)(5) to the Public Health
Service Act).
120. Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009,
Pub. L. No. 111-148, sec. 7002, § 351(l)(4), 124 Stat. 119, 811 (to
be codified at 29 U.S.C. § 262).
121. See id. § 351(k)(6)(C)(i) at 806.
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risk, similar to all other non-pharmaceutical products,
and the equitable injunctive power of the court hearing
the patentee’s infringement case will presumably ensure
that biogenerics with weak claims will not take away an
innovator’s rightful market share. Both bills have long
exclusivity periods for the first biosimilar, which provides
a strong incentive for these companies to develop their
products quickly.
Unlike the unsuccessful House legislation,
the actual biosimilar pathway affords innovators extra
incentives to game the system and gain extra exclusivity
time over second-to-file biogenerics. For example, if
the infringement action by the innovator against the
first biosimilar is dismissed or a final decision is reached,
the first biogeneric’s total potential exclusivity time is
actually extended to eighteen months after the dismissal
or decision, provided the biogeneric does not come to
market.122 Therefore, the strategy that is beneficial for
both the first generic biologic and the innovator is to
settle an ancillary patent to begin the reverse payment
process and then move toward a final decision or
dismissal. From this point, the parties would have a
reverse payment regime in place, with the biosimilar
qualified for the extended eighteen-month exclusivity
period. The settlement would provide the innovator
with at least eighteen months of exclusivity and the
first biosimilar with at least eighteen months of reverse
payments. Unless the economics of the biogeneric
market diverge dramatically from the traditional generic
drug market, reverse payments exchanged for eighteen
months of innovator monopoly should clearly result in
an improved financial outcome for both the biogeneric
and innovator when compared with the alternative:
twelve months of shared marketing exclusivity.
These reverse payments would avoid accruing
antitrust liability because the heightened exclusivity
period attaches even if the first biosimilar loses the
infringement suit brought by the innovator.123 There is
no certification analogous to Paragraph IV on file with
the FDA for the first biosimilar to amend that would
relinquish its right to exclusivity, so a biosimilar that
chose not to come to market may not be at fault for
delaying others. However, even if a court decides that
a biosimilar violates antitrust law if it accepts reverse
payments without beginning its marketing exclusivity
period as soon as permitted, the enacted biosimilar
approval pathway provides a way to escape liability. A
122. See id. § 351(k)(6)(B) at 806.
123. See id.

biogeneric could strategically use a statutorily-mandated
180 days notice to the innovator prior to commercial
marketing124 to ensure that its minimum of one year
of market exclusivity125 plus the additional 180 days of
required waiting results in exactly the same eighteenmonth delay126 for all other generic entrants regardless of
whether reverse payments are made. This prevents the
biogeneric from accruing antitrust liability for causing
a bottleneck in the approval of additional biogenerics.
In this situation, a court could not justly hold the
biosimilar responsible for the delay because the statute
requires the biogeneric to give the notice, which prevents
the biogeneric from initiating its marketing exclusivity
period sooner.
Under this strategy, all additional entrants can
be delayed eighteen months, but the only way for the
generic biologic to get eighteen months of heightened
profit instead of twelve months of shared exclusivity
is to enter into a reverse settlement. By providing a
longer exclusivity period for biogenerics that do not
immediately enter the market, the current biosimilar
law sets up an approval process that strongly incentivizes
reverse payments.
Conclusion
The ANDA process under Hatch-Waxman,
especially Paragraph IV, facilitates reverse settlements.
The result is an explosion of litigation: patent
infringement suits, followed by reverse payments,
followed by antitrust suits. Pharmaceutical companies
reasonably respond to the incentives created by the law,
and this process, beginning with an infringement suit
and ending in murky antitrust waters, is unlikely to
abate any time soon. It appears as though all the circuits
allow at least some reverse settlements, and short of new
legislation banning them, they will remain prominent
in pharmaceutical patent litigation. The new biosimilar
124. See id. § 351(l)(8)(A) at 813 (“Notice of commercial marketing. The subsection (k) applicant shall provide notice to the reference product sponsor not later than 180 days before the date of the
first commercial marketing of the biological product licensed under
subsection (k).”). The applicant can give notice after submitting an
application, and must give the innovator 180 days before marketing
the biogeneric, but the applicant should otherwise be able to choose
when to give this notice, and it reasonable for the biogeneric to wait
if it is embroiled in a lawsuit with the innovator. If the biogeneric
does not give notice until a settlement agreement with reverse payments is in place, the notice requirement can act to preclude the
biogeneric from ending its exclusivity period for eighteen months,
whether it does eighteen months of reverse payments or six months
of required waiting and then twelve months of shared exclusivity.
125. See id. § 351(k)(6)(A) at 806.
126. See id. § 351(k)(6)(B) at 806.
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approval process passed by Congress is designed in a
way that encourages reverse settlements, so biogenerics
will probably be subjected to the same quantity of
unnecessary litigation as ANDA generic drugs.
If Congress chooses to reexamine the biosimilar
pathway it passed as part of healthcare reform, it should
avoid incentivizing reverse settlements. Pay-for-delay
agreements should be discouraged by giving the first
biosimilar extra exclusivity time if it begins selling
its product immediately upon FDA approval. If the
biosimilar either accepts reverse payments and stays
off the market or waits for any infringement litigation
to conclude before coming to market, it should be
ineligible for extra exclusivity time. Under this scheme,
at least one generic product will reach the market
quickly, lowering prices for consumers. A longer
exclusivity period for the first biogeneric will partially
mitigate the loss to the innovator, because the innovator
will have half of a duopoly for the lengthened exclusivity
period and will be able to postpone the full onslaught
of generic competition. A longer exclusivity period for
the first biosimilar, applying only if it comes to market
quickly, will shift the economic incentives away from
reverse settlements.
The three-way intersection between patent,
antitrust, and drug law exists because the road to generic
drug approval was not ideally designed. The new
biosimilar pathway had the chance to become a detour
to innovation and efficiency, but is currently just another
road at the intersection.
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